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TORT AND EVIDENCE LAW—A SPHINX WITHOUT A SECRET:
THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE AND MANDATORY HEALTH IN
SURANCE IN MASSACHUSETTS
INTRODUCTION
“My dear Gerald,” I answered, “Lady Alroy was simply a woman
with a mania for mystery. She took these rooms for the pleasure
of going there with her veil down, and imagining she was a hero
ine. She had a passion for secrecy, but she herself was merely a
Sphinx without a secret.”1

Just like Oscar Wilde’s Lady Alroy in her chambers, in court
rooms all over the country, the parties’ insurance has been jealously
enshrouded in secrecy.2 And, of course, so have been insurance
payments.3 By virtue of the so-called “collateral source rule,”4
courts generally do not allow evidence of third party payments in
personal injury cases.5 There are several justifications for the rule,
discussed in Part I of this Note.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the collat
eral source rule in the recent case Law v. Griffith. 6 There, the
plaintiff was injured in a car accident, caused by the defendant, Mr.
Griffith, against whom the court entered a judgment.7 The Griffith
court did not admit evidence of the actual insurance payments for
1. OSCAR WILDE, THE SPHINX WITHOUT A SECRET 84-85 (A.R. Keller & Co.,
Inc. 1907). Wilde’s protagonist, Lord Murchison, was in love with Lady Alroy, a myste
rious woman, whose puzzling behavior he was trying to unravel after her sudden death.
When going to an apartment, which his beloved used to visit in disguise, he was told
that the lady did not do anything unusual there but read books and have tea. It turned
out that, despite the air of mystery she had surrounded herself with, she had nothing to
hide.
2. See FED. R. EVID. 411 (stating that evidence that a person charged with negli
gence does or does not have liability insurance is inadmissible); Mangan v. Broderick &
Bascom Rope Co., 351 F.2d 24, 30 (7th Cir. 1965) (finding that defense counsel’s men
tioning of the fact that the plaintiff carried workman’s compensation was prejudicial).
See generally JACOB A. STEIN, STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES § 13:14 (3d ed.
2010) (discussing the limited admissibility of evidence of collateral sources).
3. See Law v. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d 126, 131 (Mass. 2010) (ruling that collateral
source payments are inadmissible in evidence).
4. See infra Part I.
5. STEIN, supra note 2, § 13:14.
6. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 129; see infra Part II.
7. Law v. Griffith, No. 03-3179, 2006 WL 6482934 at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 24,
2006), rev’d, 930 N.E.2d 126 (Mass. 2010).
619

620

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:619

the medical services rendered to the plaintiff.8 However, it admit
ted evidence of the victim’s medical bills, as well as a range of pay
ments accepted by the victim’s health care provider.9 The problem
in that case, and a main focus of this Note, is the huge discrepancy
between the amount the provider billed the victim and the amount
it accepted as a payment in full.10 The difference between those
two figures—attributable to the deeply discounted rate the victim’s
insurer had negotiated with the provider11—was almost ninety-six
thousand dollars.12 Presented with those two numbers and all the
numbers in between, the jury would have to determine the “fair and
reasonable” charge for the service rendered by the health care pro
vider.13 The jury would not be aware of how much was actually
paid on behalf of the victim. Neither would it know who, if anyone,
had paid her medical bills; the plaintiff’s health insurance would be
discreetly kept out of the picture.14 However, health insurance in
Massachusetts can hardly be a secret, since it is actually an obliga
tion.15 Therefore, trying to conceal it is just as pointless as Lady
Alroy hiding in her room.
This Note will argue that in the Commonwealth of Massachu
setts the collateral source rule, as applied to health insurance reim
bursement, is outdated and is more harmful than beneficial. Part I
of this Note will provide an overview of the notion of compensation
in negligence cases and will explain the origins and the purpose of
the collateral source rule. Part II will discuss the reasons for the
discrepancy between medical bills and insurance write-offs, and
their application in Law v. Griffith. Part III will touch upon the
current tendency toward abrogation of the collateral source rule in
various other states. Part IV will discuss what makes Massachusetts
unique with regard to health insurance. Finally, Part V will analyze
the shortcomings of the collateral source rule and will propose that
the state legislature abrogate the rule as applied to medical pay
8. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 129.
9. Id.
10. Id. (stating that the provider accepted $16,387.14 in lieu of a $112,269.94 bill).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. (discussing the standard for recovery of medical expenses in negligence
cases).
14. See id. (ruling that collateral source payments are irrelevant and therefore,
inadmissible).
15. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111M, § 2(a) (2010) (indicating that with very nar
row exceptions, heath insurance is required for Massachusetts residents).
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ments by health insurance companies, and make such evidence
available at trial.
I. COMPENSATORY DAMAGES AND
COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE

THE

The purpose of compensation for damages is to place the tort
victim in a position that he would have been in had the wrong not
occurred.16 In general, the victim is not expected to make a profit
on compensatory damages.17 However, in certain instances, exces
sive recovery is acceptable as an incidental effect of furthering an
other major goal of the tort system—deterrence from
wrongdoing.18 It is considered that in order to effectively discour
age a tortious act, the wrongdoer should be required to pay the full
amount of the damage she has caused,19 even if that payment
amounts to overcompensation.20 One of the instances where the
tort system allows the victim double recovery is when the victim has
another source of payment for her injury. In such circumstances
the collateral source rule comes into play.21
According to the collateral source rule, any “[p]ayments made
to . . . the injured party from other sources are not credited against
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 cmt. a (1979) (stating “the law of
torts attempts primarily to put an injured person in a position as nearly as possible
equivalent to his position prior to the tort”).
17. See Cortez v. Trans Union, LLC, 617 F.3d 688, 693 n.30 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Un
like punitive damages that are intended to punish and deter, compensatory damages are
intended to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered by reason of the
defendant’s wrongful conduct.” (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell,
538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003))) (internal quotation marks omitted); Westric Battery Co. v.
Standard Elec. Co., 482 F.2d 1307, 1318 (10th Cir. 1973) (“Appellant is entitled to be
compensated for losses attributable to the injury inflicted, but it is not entitled to earn a
profit”) (emphasis added); 25 C.J.S. Damages § 21 (2010) (“Compensatory damages are
damages sufficient in amount to indemnify the injured person for the loss suffered and
thereby make him or her whole. The purpose of awarding compensatory damages is not
to enable the injured party to make a profit on the transaction”) (emphasis added) (foot
note omitted).
18. See generally 1 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 19 (2000) (stating that
courts have recognized the deterrence from conduct that may lead to tort liability is
another aim of tort law).
19. Id. (stating that tort law “deter[s] certain kinds of conduct by imposing liabil
ity when that conduct causes harm”).
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A(2) cmt. b (1979). “The injured
party’s net loss may have been reduced correspondingly, and to the extent that the
defendant is required to pay the total amount there may be a double compensation for a
part of the plaintiff’s injury.” Id. (emphasis added).
21. Id.
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the tortfeasor’s liability.”22 The rule encompasses any kind of com
pensation from third parties, such as insurance policies,23 employ
ment benefits,24 gratuities (both in cash and in free-of-charge
services),25 and social legislation benefits such as pensions, social
security, or welfare.26
The collateral source rule is an English common law rule27 and
its application in the United States dates back to the nineteenth
century case The Propeller Monticello v. Mollision.28 Monticello in
volved a collision between a propeller and a schooner, resulting in
total loss of the schooner and its cargo.29 The United States Su
preme Court held the owner of the propeller responsible, refusing
to consider the fact that the schooner was insured,30 and ordered
that the defendant pay to the owner of the schooner the full value
of the vessel and the lost cargo.31
In the context of personal injury, the collateral source rule
means that payments made by the victim’s health insurance will not
be considered when assessing the compensation that the tortfeasor
will have to pay.32 Therefore, if A negligently causes B an injury,
under the collateral source rule, even if B is treated for free or his
insurance pays for his treatment, A will be liable for the exact same
amount as if B’s injury were never covered. The underlying pre
sumption of the rule is that if a potential wrongdoer were liable to
the victim for the full monetary value of his injury, the wrongdoing
would be less likely to materialize.33 Courts recognize that the ap
plication of the rule may result in overcompensating, but assert that
this is acceptable in cases where not allowing excessive recovery
would mean a “windfall” for the tortfeasor.34
22. Id. at § 920A(2).
23. Id. at § 920A cmt. c(1).
24. Id. at § 920A cmt. c(2).
25. Id. at § 920A cmt. c(3).
26. Id. at § 920A cmt. c(4).
27. Id. at § 920A cmt. d.
28. The Propeller Monticello v. Mollision, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 152 (1854).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 155 (“The contract with the insurer is in the nature of a wager between
third parties, with which the trespasser has no concern.”).
31. Id.
32. See Law v. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d 126, 132 (Mass. 2010) (quoting Goldstein v.
Gontarz, 309 N.E.2d 196, 203 (Mass. 1974)) (stating that “jurors might be led by the
irrelevancy” of the third party payment and deny recovery for the plaintiff); Corsetti v.
Stone Co., 483 N.E.2d 793, 802 (Mass. 1985).
33. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 132.
34. Id. (“[A]voiding a windfall to a tortfeasor is preferable even if a plaintiff
thereby receives an excessive recovery in some circumstances.”); Pipkins v. TA Operat
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A. Rationale for the Collateral Source Rule
The collateral source rule has a dual function: it is both an evi
dentiary rule and a rule of damages.35 Thus, its two main justifica
tions center around those two functions—ensuring that the
tortfeasor will pay an adequate award for the damages he caused,
and that the jury has an adequate basis for calculating that award.
1. A Windfall to the Victim—the Lesser of Two Evils
The collateral source rule is based on the belief that a windfall
for one of the parties is inevitable: either the plaintiff will get more
than necessary to make him whole, by recovering both from the
tortfeasor and from another source, or the tortfeasor will pay less
than the full amount of the damages he or she caused. Indeed, the
rationale is:
[R]educing recovery by the amount of the benefits received by
the plaintiff would grant a windfall to the defendant by allowing
a credit for the reasonable value of those benefits. Such credit
would result in the benefits being effectively directed to the
tortfeasor and from the intended party—the injured plaintiff. If
there is a windfall, it is considered more just that the injured per
son profit rather than grant the wrongdoer relief from full re
sponsibility for the wrongdoing.36

Analyzed that way, it may seem more reasonable that the victim,
not the wrongdoer, reaps the benefit from having health insurance
even if it leads to overcompensation.37
2. Avoiding Jury Confusion
Another common justification for disallowing collateral source
payments into evidence is the belief that the jury would not award
the portion of the compensation covered by the collateral source.38
Courts have ruled that this phenomenon would have several perni
ing Corp., 466 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1262 (D.N.M. 2006) (“[A]ny windfall arising from the
collateral source rule should benefit the plaintiff, and not the tortfeasor.”); Lopez v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 129 P.3d 487, 491-92 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006).
35. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 127; Gormley v. GTE Prods. Corp., 587 So. 2d 455, 457
(Fla. 1991).
36. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 392 (2003).
37. See Corsetti, 483 N.E.2d at 802; Pipkins, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 1262 (noting that,
under New Mexico law, “any windfall arising from the collateral source rule should
benefit the plaintiff, and not the tortfeasor”); Lopez, 129 P.3d at 491-92.
38. See Goldstein v. Gontarz, 309 N.E.2d 196, 203 (Mass. 1974) (stating that “ju
rors might be led by the irrelevancy” of the third party payment and deny recovery for
the plaintiff).
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cious effects. For one, the defendant would pay less than the rea
sonable value for the treatment of the injury she caused.39
Additionally, the plaintiff would receive an unjustly reduced award
and thereby would be, in effect, “punished” for having purchased
insurance.40 The insurer would lose its right to recover the amount
it paid, which would ultimately result in a rise in insurance premi
ums.41 For all these reasons, many courts have refused to allow any
evidence of the presence or lack of collateral source payments.42
Conversely, evidence of third party payments has been allowed
in limited circumstances, where such evidence has been necessary
to rebut misleading testimony by the plaintiff.43 Once the plaintiff
affirmatively leads the jury to believe that he has not received any
third party benefits, evidence of such payments becomes
admissible.44

39.
40.

See Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 132.
See Helfend v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 465 P.2d 61, 66-67 (Cal. 1970).

If we were to permit a tortfeasor to mitigate damages with payments from
plaintiff’s insurance, plaintiff would be in a position inferior to that of having
bought no insurance, because his payment of premiums would have earned no
benefit. Defendant should not be able to avoid payment of full compensation
for the injury inflicted merely because the victim has had the foresight to pro
vide [herself] with insurance.
Id.
41. 1 DOBBS, supra note 18, at 1059.
42. See Gormley v. GTE Prods. Corp., 587 So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla. 1991); Wills v.
Foster, 892 N.E.2d 1018, 1022-23 (Ill. 2008); Martinez v. Milburn Enters., Inc 233 P.3d
205, 235 (Kan. 2010); Griffith, 930 N.E.2d, at 131-32; Leitinger v. Van Buren Mgmt.,
Inc., 720 N.W.2d 152, 158 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006).
43. See Lange v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 703 F.2d 322, 323-24 (8th Cir. 1983) (the plaintiff
falsely testified he had no disability insurance and had to return to work immediately
after his surgery); York v. Young, 608 S.W.2d 20, 21.
(Ark. 1980) (the plaintiff, who had collision coverage, claimed he could not afford to
have his vehicle repaired); Corsetti v. Stone Co., 483 N.E.2d 793, 801-03 (Mass. 1985)
(the plaintiff claimed he was impoverished due to his joblessness, caused by his injury,
whereas he received more in compensation after his injury than he used to make while
working); Jojola v. Baldridge Lumber Co., 635 P.2d 316, 320 (N.M. Ct. App.1981) (the
plaintiff exaggerated the gravity of his financial troubles caused by his injury, leading
the jury to believe he received no compensation at all). In all of those cases evidence
for collateral source payments was allowed, despite the fact that the respective jurisdic
tions recognize the collateral source rule.
44. Jackson v. Beard, 255 N.E.2d 837, 847 (Ind. Ct. App. 1970) (stating that “[t]he
[plaintiff] having opened the gate on the matter of reduced income as a result of the
collision complained of” defeated the collateral source rule and gave the defendant’s
counsel the right to cross-examine the plaintiff on the issue).
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B. Excessive Recovery and Subrogation Rights of the Insurers
Opponents of the collateral source rule often criticize it on the
grounds that it allows “double dipping” by the plaintiff.45 However,
the notion of “double recover[y]”46 is somewhat of a misnomer be
cause generally health insurance companies are entitled to recuper
ate their payments from the award plaintiff receives.47 In this
respect, the victim does not necessarily recover twice for the same
injury because he pays back the benefits received from the collat
eral party.
Understandably, the insurer is entitled solely to the amount it
paid and not the full amount received by the plaintiff.48 Therefore,
in situations where the amount recovered from the tortfeasor is
greater than the amount the insurer paid, there is a sum that theo
retically belongs to no one. It does not belong to the insurance
company, because the company has already recouped what it
paid.49 The health care provider is not entitled to it, because the
provider is bound by its contract with the insurance company to
render services at certain negotiated rate50 and getting more than
the agreed upon price would be a violation of that agreement.51
The tortfeasor cannot get it back, because she, presumably, paid no
more than the “fair and reasonable charge” of the injury she in
flicted.52 The victim does not owe it, because his treatment was al
45. See Michael W. Cromwell, Note, Cutting the Fat Out of Healthcare Costs: Why
Medicare and Medicaid Write-Offs Should Not Be Recoverable Under Oklahoma’s Col
lateral Source Rule, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 585, 590 (2010); see also RESTATEMENT (SEC
OND) OF TORTS § 920 A(1) cmt. b (1979) (stating “to the extent that the defendant is
required to pay the total amount there may be a double compensation for a part of the
plaintiff’s injury . . .”) (emphasis added).
46. Cromwell, supra note 45, at 590.
47. 44A AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 1785 n.2 (2010).
48. See generally Guillermo Gabriel Zorogastua, Improperly Divorced from Its
Roots: The Rationales of the Collateral Source Rule and Their Implications for Medicare
and Medicaid Write-Offs, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 463, 469-70 (2007) (discussing principle of
subrogation).
49. Id.
50. See Law v. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d 126, 129 n.3 (Mass. 2010) (explaining the na
ture of MassHealth); see also 42 C.F.R. § 447.15 (2010) (stating that Medicaid dis
counted payments should be accepted as payment in full by the provider); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 18 § 5H (2010) (stating that “[p]ayment by the department under the medical
assistance program shall constitute payment in full . . .[.] [A] provider may not recover
from any health insurer an amount greater than the amount so paid.”).
51. See Sylvestre v. Martin, No. SUCV2003-05988, 2008 WL 82631, at *2 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 2008) (citing Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 425 N.E.2d 313, 316
(Mass. 1981) (discussing the restrictions on “balance billing”–charging the insured the
difference between the provider’s full charge and the discount rate)).
52. See Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 128 (internal quotations omitted).
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ready covered. But the victim is also the only party in this entire
scheme who, if awarded the extra money, would not be profiting
from another party’s contract.53 The reason is that, if the tortfeasor
does not have to pay the difference between the “reasonable” value
of the treatment and the written-off payment, the tortfeasor will be
profiting from the victim’s contract with his health insurance com
pany and from the agreement between the health insurer and the
medical provider. Since the victim is the one who purchased (or
otherwise received) his health insurance, courts have considered it
to be the least unjust outcome for the victim to receive the differ
ence between the cost incurred and the price paid.54
In this regard, the victim does not get compensated twice for
the same expense, but receives a larger amount than the one the
insurance company paid on his behalf. Often this amount is negligi
ble,55 or in some circumstances may serve to offset costs the victim
was not compensated for.56 In other situations, however, it may
lead to quite striking results.57 Such situations are those involving
health insurance write-offs.58

53. See id. at 132 (asserting that defendant is not to benefit from victim’s health
insurance contract); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS 18 § 5H (2010) (saying that a health care
provider shall accept the negotiated rate as payment in full).
54. See Lopez v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 129 P.3d 487, 491-92 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006);
Pipkins v. TA Operating Corp., 466 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1262 (D.N.M. 2006); Goldstein v.
Gontarz, 309 N.E.2d 196, 203 (Mass. 1974); Shea v. Rettie, 192 N.E. 44 (Mass. 1934).
Shea was cited in Griffith in support of the assertion that it would be unfair if the
tortfeasor benefits from the victim’s insurance. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 132 (citing Shea,
192 N.E. at 45-46).
55. See 1 DOBBS, supra note 18, at 1058 (stating that “overcompensation is often
more theoretical than real”).
56. Bryce Benjet, A Review of State Law Modifying the Collateral Source Rule:
Seeking Greater Fairness in Economic Damages Award, 76 DEF. COUNS. J. 210, 210
(2009) (stating that one of the justifications of the collateral source rule is that the extra
funds are used to offset attorney fees); see also The Legal Pad, The Beauty of DoubleDipping, THE BLOG OF CALLAW.COM (April 21, 2006, 3:47 pm), http://legalpad.word
press.com/2006/04/21/double-dipping/ (stating that a tort victim, who was also an attor
ney, asserted: “[t]he trial judge recognized that part of the reason for the collateral
source rule is to offset all the deductions that get taken from the judgment before it
finally gets to the plaintiff’s pocket”).
57. See Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 129 (provider accepted $16,387.14 in lieu of a $112,
269.94 bill).
58. A “write-off” is the difference between the amount billed by a medical pro
vider and the amount the provider agrees to accept as payment in full for the same
service. See Robinson v. Bates, 857 N.E.2d 1195, 1198 (Ohio 2006); see also discussion
infra Part II.
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At first glance, there is nothing striking about the Griffith case.
The facts and the procedural posture are fairly straightforward, and
the real difficulty of the case does not become apparent until the
damages determination stage. When Joanne Law was injured in a
car accident, she went to the hospital, received medical treatment,
and MassHealth60 promptly paid the bill. She sued the driver of the
vehicle that caused her injuries, and recovered $28,556.50 as com
pensation for that same treatment.61 Subsequently, Ms. Law ap
pealed and sought to introduce the actual hospital bill totaling
$112,269.90 as evidence of the “fair and reasonable charge”62 for
her medical service, despite the fact that neither she nor
MassHealth paid that sum.63 The defendant, on the other hand,
wanted to present the jury with the actual amount paid,
$16,387.14.64 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court allowed
the bill but excluded from evidence the actual payment.65 As the
case was ultimately settled,66 it is unclear how much the jury would
have awarded on remand. If the plaintiff had received the full
amount of the bill, MassHealth would have been able to get its
$16,387.14 back67 and Ms. Law would have kept the remaining
$95,882.7668 in addition to all the other compensatory damages she
59. See infra Part IV.2 (discussing the procedural posture of Griffith).
60. MassHealth is a public health insurance plan for qualifying low-income Mas
sachusetts residents. See HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, http://www.mass.gov/eohhs/
gov/departments/masshealth/ (last visited May 24, 2012). This Note does not consider
any differences between private and public health insurance.
61. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 129. The jury awarded initially $48 500 but found Ms.
Law twenty-five percent liable for her own injury. As a result of the plaintiff’s contrib
utory negligence, the judge reduced her award by $12,125. Further, the award was re
duced by $7,818.50 due to compensation the plaintiff had already received. Id.
62. See id. at 130 (discussing the standard for recovery of medical expenses in
negligence cases).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. The Massachusetts Supreme Court remanded the case to trial court on the
sole issue of appropriate damages. Id. at 136. In a phone call to the Essex County
Superior Court, the author was informed that the case was subsequently settled for an
undisclosed amount. Id.
67. See Zorogastua, supra note 48, at 469 (discussing the principle of subrogation,
stating that “[t]hrough subrogation, a third party pays the plaintiff’s debt and then ‘re
ceives’ the plaintiff’s rights and remedies”). In the given context, where MassHealth
has paid for the plaintiff’s medical bills on her behalf, it is entitled to receive the com
pensation for those bills subsequently received by the tortfeasor.
68. See Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 132.
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would have received. In this scenario she would have essentially
been awarded almost six times the amount that her insurer paid on
her behalf, all tax-free.69
The substantial difference between the medical bills and the
amount accepted as payment in full comes from the discrepancy
between the “full price” of a medical service juxtaposed with the
so-called insurance “write-offs.”70 In effect, the only patients who
pay the list price are the uninsured,71 who have never had the
chance to negotiate for discount rates with the medical providers in
the manner insurance companies do.72 Often medical providers ac
cept exceptionally low payments from insurance companies while
off-setting the losses they incur by raising the cost for the unin
sured.73 In certain instances, as in Griffith, the health care provider
would accept as payment in full as little as one seventh of the
amount of the bill submitted.74 In effect, the collateral source rule
allows the victim of negligence to recover that difference. Those
disparities between the amount charged and the compensation re
ceived have prompted many states to reevaluate the reasonableness
of the collateral source rule at present time.
III. COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE REFORM
Perceived sometimes as an “oddit[y] of American accident
law,”75 the collateral source rule has been criticized by legal schol
69. See 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2006) (excluding “physical personal injuries” from
taxable income).
70. See Robinson v. Bates, 857 N.E.2d 1195, 1198 (Ohio 2006) (stating that a
“write-off” is the difference between the amount billed by a medical provider and the
amount the provider agrees to accept as payment in full for the same service).
71. See Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 133.
72. See Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Con
tracts and the New Medical Market Place, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643, 645 (2008).
73. Id. at 645 (stating that “insurers aggressively negotiate rates for plan mem
bers; uninsured patients must ‘bargain’ individually with providers who are determined
to recoup what they bargained away to insurers”); see also Alicia Curtis, The Reasona
ble Value of Medical Services: A Hospital Bill, the Insurer’s Payment, or the Jury’s
Choice?, 23 ME. B.J. 78, 78 (2008) (discussing the complexity of the calculation of the
value of a treatment in the “distorted market for medical services”); James McGrath,
Overcharging the Uninsured in Hospitals: Shifting a Greater Share of Uncompensated
Medical Care Costs to the Federal Government, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 173, 175-76
(2007) (discussing the free market approach toward medical billing, where providers
accept below market payments for their services and then shift the losses to uninsured).
74. See Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 126.
75. See John G. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort
Law, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1478, 1478 (1966).
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ars and courts in certain jurisdictions.76 The common law rule de
veloped at a point in time when insurance virtually did not exist;77
the contemporary reality, however, where risk-allocation is a com
mon practice, has prompted a few changes to the traditional com
pensatory schemes. As part of a broader tort reform, many states
have modified the collateral source rule in certain contexts78 and
completely abolished it in others.79
Most relevant statutes do not allow recovery for damages al
ready paid by a collateral source, but those statutes do not prohibit
the plaintiff from recovering for damages when a third party payor
has subrogation rights.80 The idea of this change is to protect the
subrogation rights of the insurers, which would presumably keep
insurance premiums low.81 Certain jurisdictions have enacted stat
utes barring the collateral rule in all personal injury actions for
damages over a certain amount. Addressing the issue of overcom
76. See Fleming supra note 75, at 1478; see also Zorogastua supra note 48; Doug
las H. Cook, Personal Responsibility and the Law of Torts, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1245,
1260, 1274 (1996) (commenting on Richard C. Maxwell, The Collateral Source Rule in
the American Law of Damages, 46 MINN. L. REV. 669, 694-95 (1962) (discussing the
collateral source rule as being at odds with the compensatory function of tort law)).
77. Bryce Benjet, A Review of State Law Modifying the Collateral Source Rule:
Seeking Greater Fairness in Economic Damages Awards, 76 DEF. COUNS. J. 210, 211
(2009).
78. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60G(a) (2010) (mandating the admis
sion of evidence of collateral source payments in the context of medical malpractice).
Similarly, CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 3333.1 (West 1997) and DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18,
§ 6862 (West 1999) abrogate the collateral source rule in the context of medical
malpractice.
79. The collateral source rule had been completely abrogated in: Alabama (ALA.
CODE § 6-5-545 (2005)), Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.070 (2010)), Colorado (COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-111.6 (West 2004)), Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52
225a (2012)), Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.76 (West 2011)), Idaho (IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 6-1606 (2010)), Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 34-44-1-2 (West 1999)), Iowa (IOWA
CODE ANN. § 668.14 (West 1998)), Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.6303
(West 2000)), Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 548.251 (West 2010)), New York (N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 3101(f) (McKinney 2011)), North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-06
(1996)), Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.20 (West 2011)), and Oregon (OR. REV.
STAT. § 31.580 (2005) (as cited in Zorogastua, supra note 48, at 500); see also Collateral
Source Rule Reform, AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, http://www.atra.org/issues/collateral
source-rule-reform (last visited May 24, 2012) (summary of the states which have abro
gated or modified the collateral source rule); 1 DOBBS, supra note 18, at 1058-61 (dis
cussing the rationale and the substance of modifications of the collateral source rule
among the states); Benjet, supra note 77, at 210.
80. Benjet, supra note 77, at 211.
81. See 1 DOBBS, supra note 18, at 1059. The idea is that if the collateral source
rule were repealed the insurer would not be able to ever recuperate what it paid out for
the plaintiff’s loss, and therefore insurance premiums would rise. This Note, however,
does not agree with such a proposition because it rests on the inaccurate presumption
that abolishing the rule necessarily precludes recovery.
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pensation, Montana, for example, requires deduction of prior col
lateral source payments from any compensation for personal injury
or death, where the total award exceeds $50,000.82 The jury deter
mines the award without consideration of any collateral source pay
ments and subsequently, upon separate submission of evidence, the
trial judge must subtract such payments from the award.83
Overall, the state laws concerning the collateral source rule re
main inconsistent. Some states, including Massachusetts, have re
pealed the rule in specific contexts, but keep applying it in others.84
State legislatures have been particularly willing to repeal the rule in
medical malpractice lawsuits, presumably for policy reasons.85 Cer
tain courts have found statutes abrogating the collateral source to
be unconstitutional,86 others have upheld them.87 It appears that
similar statutes may or may not pass constitutional muster depend
ing on the state they are adopted in. The Kansas Supreme Court in
Thompson v. KFB for instance, found a statute allowing evidence
of collateral source payments in cases where the plaintiff’s damages
which exceeded $150,000 to be in violation of the rights of equal
protection and due process, as set forth in the United States and
Kansas Constitutions.88 According to the Thompson court, the act
failed to satisfy even the low “rationality basis” test and provided
no reasonable justification for the created classification of the plain
tiffs.89 The Supreme Court of Alabama, however, upheld an even
82. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-308 (1987).
83. See Haman v. Maco Ins. Co., 86 P.3d 34, 37 (Mont. 2004) (Nelson, J., dissent
ing) (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-308).
84. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60-G (2010) (providing for medical malpractice
awards to be offset by collateral sources minus any premiums paid by the claimant to
secure those benefits); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6862 (West 1999 & Supp. 2010) (per
mitting evidence for collateral source payments in medical malpractice lawsuits). How
ever, in both Massachusetts and Delaware the rule is still applicable in the personal
injury context. See, e.g., Law v. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d 126, 131 (Mass 2010); Miller v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 993 A.2d 1049, 1053 (Del. 2010).
85. See supra note 84; see also infra Part IV.A.1.
86. See, e.g., Farley v. Engelken, 740 P.2d 1058, 1068 (Kan. 1987) (finding that the
statute abrogating the collateral source rule discriminated against medical malpractice
victims); O’Bryan v. Hedgespeth, 892 S.W.2d 571, 578 (Ky. 1995) (finding that the stat
ute abrogating the rule was a violation of the separation of powers, since admission of
evidence is a judicial function) (cited in 1 DOBBS, supra note 18, at 1059 n.22).
87. See, e.g., Eastin v. Broomfield, 570 P.2d 744, 753 (Ariz. 1977) (the court up
held an act repealing the collateral source rule, rejecting an equal protection argument)
(cited in 1 DOBBS, supra note 18, at 1059 n.23).
88. Thompson v. KFB Ins. Co., 850 P.2d 773, 774 (Kan. 1993).
89. Id. The court stated that, assuming that lowering the cost of health insurance
was the objective of the statute and it was a reasonable one, the classification did not
reasonably further such objective. Id. at 773.
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broader statute, allowing evidence for collateral source payments in
all civil actions.90 In Marsh v. Green,91 the court rejected plaintiff’s
due process and equal protection claims, holding the statute consti
tutional and thereby reversing a previous case, American Legion
Post No. 57 v. Leahey.92
The idea of a collateral source rule reform has been accepted
ambivalently by different states, and the courts’ polar attitudes to
wards this reform remain difficult to reconcile. Recent health care
law reforms in Massachusetts93 have arguably made the applicabil
ity of the collateral source rule even more controversial.
IV. HOW
A.

IS

MASSACHUSETTS DIFFERENT?

The Collateral Source Rule in Massachusetts
1.

Abrogation of the Collateral Source Rule in Medical
Malpractice

Concerned with the ever-rising cost of health insurance, Mas
sachusetts has partially repealed the collateral source rule by adopt
ing a statute applying to medical malpractice damages.94 Under
this statute, the judge in a jury trial will deduct the third party pay
ments less any premiums paid to secure those benefits after the ver
dict.95 The statute also bars the right of subrogation by collateral
sources.96 The abrogation of the rule is part of a trend in medical
malpractice reform aimed at bringing down the medical malpractice
insurance premiums of doctors, thereby decreasing the cost of their
90. See ALA. CODE § 12-21-45(a)(1975) (stating that “[i]n all civil actions where
damages for any medical or hospital expenses are claimed and are legally recoverable
for personal injury or death, evidence that the plaintiff’s medical or hospital expenses
have been or will be paid or reimbursed shall be admissible as competent evidence”),
upheld in Marsh v. Green, 782 So. 2d. 223, 231 (Ala. 2000) (denying plaintiff’s due
process and equal protection arguments).
91. Marsh, 782 So. 2d at 231. Unlike the Thompson court, the court in Marsh did
not evaluate the constitutionality of the statute, stating that the plaintiff is challenging
the policy of the act and policy questions are to be decided by the legislature, and not
the court. Id.
92. Am. Legion Post No. 57 v. Leahey, 681 So. 2d 1337 (Ala. 1996). The Leahey
court held that a statute abrogating the collateral source rule violated equal protection
and due process. Four years later the court reversed itself in the Marsh opinion. See
Marsh, 782 So. 2d. at 231.
93. See infra Part IV.B.
94. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60G(a) (2010).
95. Id.
96. Id. § 60G(c).
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services and ultimately lowering the cost of health insurance.97 As
Griffith demonstrated, however, the Massachusetts Supreme Judi
cial Court is reluctant to disregard the collateral source rule in the
context of personal injury.98
2. Griffith’s Majority and Section 79G
In Law v. Griffith, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court,
confronted with the issue of whether to admit the evidence of sub
stantial insurance write-offs, decided to maintain the status quo and
disallow such evidence, thereby refusing to abrogate the collateral
source rule.99 Generally, in order for the plaintiff to receive com
pensation for medical services, he or she must prove that: “(1) he or
she has paid or become liable for the medical bills, (2) the defen
dant’s negligence was the cause of the injuries, and (3) the charges
were reasonable for the services rendered.”100
The dispute in Griffith centered around the third requirement.
Indeed, the parties did not quarrel over the established standard
that the plaintiff should receive “the value of reasonable medical
services required to treat the injury.”101 They disagreed, however,
as to the evidence the jury should use to determine that “reasona
ble” value. The defendant argued that the actual medical bills
charged by the plaintiff’s health care provider should be excluded
from evidence for two reasons: first, because the victim, as a
MassHealth recipient, had not paid the bills herself; and second,
because MassHealth had negotiated and paid a significantly lower
amount for the medical services the plaintiff received.102 The de
fendant claimed that since no one paid the full amount of the bills,
nor was any party responsible for it, this figure was irrelevant in
establishing the reasonable value of the service.103 A Superior
Court judge accepted that argument and did not admit the bills into
evidence.104 Plaintiff appealed from the judgment, claiming that
97. See Lee Harris, Tort Reform as Carrot-and-Stick, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 163,
172 (2009).
98. Law v. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d 126, 134 (Mass. 2010).
99. Id.
100. Natalie J. Kussart, Paid Bills v. Charged Bills: Insurance and the Collateral
Source Rule, Arthur v. Catour, 833 N.E.2d 847 (2005), 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 151, 159 (2006).
101. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d, at 129 (citing Scott v. Garfield, 912 N.E.2d 1000 (Mass.
2009)).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Law v. Griffith, No. 03-3179, 2006 WL 6482934, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. July
24, 2006), rev’d, 930 N.E.2d 126 (Mass. 2010).
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the bills should have been included in evidence.105 The Appeals
Court found that the Superior Court judge erred in excluding them
and determined that a new trial on the damages was required.106
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) affirmed the
decision of the Appeals Court on the grounds that Massachusetts
law requires acceptance of the medical bills as evidence of the “fair
and reasonable charge” of the service provided.107 In the
meantime, the court refused to admit evidence of the actual amount
accepted as payment in full by the provider.108 The reason for that
was the common law collateral source rule, articulated in section
920 of the Second Restatement of Torts.109 The court did not find
anything in the language of the relevant Massachusetts legisla
tion110 that would suggest the rule was invalid in Massachusetts.111
In fact, it concluded by negative implication that by abolishing the
collateral source rule with respect to medical malpractice,112 the
legislature demonstrated its intent to keep the rule in other
contexts.113
Interestingly, the SJC in Griffith acknowledged the inadequacy
of the medical bills as evidence of the fair and reasonable value of
the medical service.114 It refused, however, to deny the applicabil
ity of the collateral source rule to personal injury damages, absent
relevant legislative action.115 The majority based its decision
105. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 129.
106. Law v. Griffith, No. 07-P-1972, 2009 WL 652945, at *1(Mass. App. Ct. 2009).
107. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 130; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 79G (2010)
(stating that “[i]n any proceeding commenced in any court . . . an itemized bill . . . shall
be admissible as evidence of the fair and reasonable charge for such services or the
necessity of such services or treatments”).
108. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 131.
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A (2) (1979) (stating that
“[p]ayments made to or benefits conferred on the injured party from other sources are
not credited against the tortfeasor’s liability, although they cover all or a part of the
harm for which the tortfeasor is liable”).
110. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 79G (2010); see also id. ch. 231, § 60G.
111. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 134.
112. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60G (2010) (abrogating the collateral source
rule in medical malpractice).
113. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 134.
114. See id. at 133 (stating that “American . . . medical care providers have devel
oped charge structures that may have little or no relationship to the reasonable value of
the medical services at issue”) (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 134-35 (comparing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 A cmt. d
(1979), stating that the collateral source rule “can be changed by statute” with Kerins v.
Lima, 680 N.E.2d 32, 43 (Mass. 1997) (quoting Commercial Wharf E. Condo. Ass’n v.
Waterfront Parking Corp., 552 N.E.2d 66, 71 (Mass.1990) (claiming that courts will not
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largely on the statutory framework: the language of section 79G,116
mandating admission of medical bills in personal injury lawsuits in
conjunction with the enactment of section 60G abrogating the col
lateral source rule in medical malpractice lawsuits.117 In sum, the
court reached the conclusion that: 1) the test for determining com
pensation is the “fair and reasonable” value of the service;118 2) the
bills may be inadequate indication for that value;119 but 3) they
must be admitted, because the statute requires it.120
To reconcile these somewhat contradictory conclusions, the
court created its own approach toward determining the “fair and
reasonable” value of a medical service. By interpreting the second
sentence of section 79G,121 the court concluded that it is appropri
ate to allow a defendant to bring a representative of the medical
provider to testify on the range of payments accepted by the pro
vider for the service rendered to the plaintiff.122 That witness, how
ever, would not be allowed to mention whether the plaintiff has
health insurance, the payor of the plaintiff’s medical bills, or the
amount of the actual payments.123
B. Mandatory Health Insurance in Massachusetts
The main reason for prohibiting disclosure of the insurance
benefits conferred upon the plaintiff is the fear that the jury will
award the plaintiff less if it is aware that she was insured at the time
of the incident.124 With regard to health insurance, however, there
is not much room for secrecy in Massachusetts. In April 2006, Gov
ernor Mitt Romney signed into law a new bill requiring all residents
presume the legislature intended “radical change in the common law without a clear
expression of such intent”)).
116. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 79G (2010) (stating that “[i]n any proceeding
commenced in any court . . . an itemized bill . . . shall be admissible as evidence of the
fair and reasonable charge for such services or the necessity of such services or
treatments”).
117. See id. ch. 231, § 60G (providing that compensation should be offset by col
lateral source payments, minus any premiums paid by the plaintiff to secure those
benefits).
118. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 128.
119. Id. at 133.
120. Id. at 130-31.
121. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 79G (2010). “Nothing contained in this section
shall be construed to limit the right of any party to the action to summon . . . such
physician, dentist, pharmacist . . . for the purpose of cross examination with respect to
such bill . . . .” Id.
122. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 135.
123. Id.
124. See Eichel v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 375 U.S. 253, 255 (1963).
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of the state to obtain health insurance,125 thereby making Massa
chusetts the first state in the nation where health insurance is
mandatory. The law was part of an “innovative bipartisan plan,”126
aimed at reducing both the number of uninsured and the cost of
health insurance.127 The plan provided that the state would estab
lish a quasi-governmental authority, the Commonwealth Health In
surance Connector,128 through which Massachusetts residents can
purchase insurance, at rates based on the individual’s income.129
Failure to abide by the compulsory purchase mandate would result
in steep penalties.130
C. The Collateral Source Rule and the Medically Uninsured
Being medically uninsured in Massachusetts seems to come at
a pretty high price, even if a person does not need to see a doctor.
If an uninsured Massachusetts resident gets injured in a car acci
dent, however, he will have to face more than a fine for being unin
sured. He will actually have to pay his full medical bill.131 So, if
Ms. Law were not a MassHealth recipient, but instead had no insur
ance, she would have had to come up with $112,269.94132 on her
own. In those circumstances, there would be no discussion about
evidence for insurance write-offs, because no such evidence would
125. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111M, § 2(a) (2010); see also David A.
Fahrenthold, Mass. Bill Requires Health Coverage, WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 2006, available
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/04/AR20060404019
37.html.
126. William C. Symonds, In Massachusetts, Health Care for All?, BUS. WK., Apr.
l4, 2006, available at http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/apr2006/pi20060404
_152510.htm.
127. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111M, § 2(a) (2010) (indicating that with very narrow
exceptions, heath insurance is required for Massachusetts residents).
128. HEALTH CONNECTOR: HEALTH INSURANCE FOR MASSACHUSETTS RE
SIDENTS, https://www.mahealthconnector.org/portal/site/connector/ (last visited May 24,
2012May 24, 2012).
129. Id.
130. See Massachusetts Health Insurance Requirements, MASSRESOURCES.ORG,
http://www.massresources.org/infopages.cfm?ABPageID=93&MainParentID=93#how
muchpenalty (providing penalty rates for the uninsured) (last visited May 24, 2012).
For example, for 2011, a 27 year old with an annual income of $32,676 (300% of Federal
Poverty Guidelines) would have to pay a tax penalty of $1,212 per year for being
uninsured.
131. See Law v. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d 126, 133 (Mass. 2010); see also George A.
Nation III, Obscene Contracts: The Doctrine of Unconscionability and Hospital Billing
of the Uninsured, 94 KY. L.J. 101, 119 (2005) (discussing the discrepancy in rates for
uninsured and insured patients).
132. See Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 129 (spelling out the full amount of the plaintiff’s
medical bills).
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exist. Following Griffith’s rationale and section 79G, the court
would admit the doctor’s bill and a range of payments accepted for
the service.133 One could only guess what price tag the jury would
have put on the medical services provided, faced with a “range” of
payments for that same service between $16,387.14134 and
$112,269.94.135 The Griffith court, however, did not comment on
whether a court should allow evidence for the full payment of the
medical bills in cases where the patient is uninsured.136
The majority in Griffith approached the collateral source rule
issue cautiously, apparently unwilling to set it aside, but in the
meantime not expressing a strong opinion in its favor. The concur
rence, on the other hand, had quite a different approach towards
the problem.
D. Justice Cowin’s Concurring Opinion in Griffith
The concurrence in Griffith 137 was more willing to comment on
and even criticize the collateral source rule. Justice Cowin, joined
by Chief Justice Ireland and Justice Spina, accepted the majority’s
analysis of the first sentence of section 79G, agreeing that the stat
ute138 unambiguously mandates the admissibility of itemized medi
cal bills as evidence for the fair and reasonable charge of a medical
service.139 However, Justice Cowin criticized the majority’s inter
pretation of the second sentence of the same statute,140 which the
majority qualified as “general” and not “delineating in any manner
the permissible scope of the witnesses’ testimony or the use of the
records.”141 The majority concluded that the Massachusetts legisla
ture intended to retain the collateral source rule in tort recovery
cases.142 Justice Cowin, however, found no language in the statute
to suggest such intent.143 According to the concurring justices, the
majority adopted an inconsistent approach with respect to the ap
plicability of the collateral source rule: on one hand, the court rec
ognized the problem of the evidentiary deficiency of the rule; on
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 128.
Id. at 131.
Id.
See id. at 135 n.16.
Id. at 136 (Cowin, J., concurring).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 79G (2010).
Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 135-36; id. at 136 (Cowin, J., concurring). .
See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 135.
Id. at 134.
Id. at 136 (Cowin, J., concurring).
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the other, it refused to repeal the rule.144 This approach, Justice
Cowin opined, conflicted with 79G, “which appear[ed] to accom
modate no restrictions on the use of other admissible evidence.”145
The concurring justices found unpersuasive the majority’s pub
lic policy argument that admitting evidence for health insurance
write-offs creates a risk for potential unequal treatment of pa
tients—recipients of MassHealth.146 If the court allowed defend
ants to present to the jury evidence of MassHealth’s deeply
discounted rates, the majority argued, the jury would award no
more than the write-off amount, thereby creating a class of people,
whose treatment is “worth” less than the treatment of plaintiffs car
rying private insurance or no insurance at all.147 Justice Cowin did
not attempt to rebut or affirm the accuracy of that presumption, but
believed it had nothing to do with determining the legislature’s in
tent when adopting section 79G.148 According to Justice Cowin, the
legislature’s intent to allow evidence of collateral payments was just
as unambiguous as its intent to allow the actual medical bills before
the jury.149 In fact, by treating both kinds of evidence (of actual
payments and medical bills) differently, the majority had miscon
strued section79G.150 The statute’s purpose, in Justice Cowin’s
view, was to provide a simple exception to the hearsay rule and not
to create confusion.151
Furthermore, Justice Cowin discussed the history of the stat
ute, enacted at a time when the funding of medical services was
organized differently, and when third party payments were the ex
ception, not the rule.152 And since health insurance write-offs were
not common practice, the actual medical bills used to reflect rela
144. See id. at 137 (stating that “[t]he court’s decision demonstrates that it recog
nizes the problem, but also that it shrinks from the most workable solution”).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 136.
147. Id. at 134 n.11 (majority opinion). The court’s presumption appears to be
that if MassHealth patients’ treatment is “cheaper” than the treatment of “richer”
plaintiffs, then the jury would undervalue all MassHealth-insured plaintiffs’ economic
losses.
148. Id. at 138 (Cowin, J., concurring) (stating also that “jurors are as likely to be
resentful of the rich as they are to be prejudiced against the poor”) Id.
149. Id. at 136.
150. Id. at 136-38.
151. “[T]he Legislature intended when it adopted in § 79G what appears to be an
uncomplicated exception to the hearsay rule.” Id at 138. Under the hearsay rule
neither medical bills, nor actual insurance payments would be admitted into evidence.
See FED. R. EVID. 801.
152. Id. at 136.
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tively accurately the reasonable value of the service.153 Justice
Cowin noted that at the present time, when health care is funded
largely by collateral sources such as private and public health insur
ance, this model has changed.154 The medical bills now “often re
flect costs, such as overhead, capital investment, research and
development, and the subsidizing of . . . medical procedures, that
are unrelated to the value of the specific services performed.”155
Those factors, bearing no relevance to the actual treatment of the
patient, have led to the inflation of charges for medical treatment,
while at the same time providers are willing to accept significantly
lower payments for the same services by insurance companies.156
Therefore, according to Justice Cowin, the medical bills are no
longer a reliable indicator of the reasonable value of medical
services.157
In order to avoid prejudice, the Griffith majority decided to
exclude evidence of Ms. Law’s payments altogether.158 However,
according to Justice Cowin, the problem with potential jury
prejudice could be easily solved by adequate jury instructions,159
without completely excluding evidence of such payments. In Justice
Cowin’s opinion, keeping a plaintiff’s health insurance obscured
from a juror, who is presumably himself insured, does nothing to
promote just compensation.160 This sort of secrecy ultimately com
pels the jury to guess which one of the “range” of numbers before it
is the correct one, instead of outright telling the jury how much was
paid.161 The new realities in health care compensation, according to
Justice Cowin, have made the collateral source rule “an anachro
nism” when applied to determining the value of medical services.162
The following section further discusses its deficiencies, particularly
in a state with mandatory health insurance.
153. Id. at 137.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 138.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 131 (majority opinion).
159. See id. at 138 (Cowin, J., concurring) (stating that “jurors overwhelmingly
fulfil [sic] their obligations with great seriousness, follow[ing] instructions”).
160. Id. at 139.
161. Id. at 138-39. “[J]urors will remain mystified by the refusal to tell them what
a given procedure actually cost. In sum, we move farther and farther from the objective
of valuing the medical services provided to the injured plaintiff.” Id. at 139 (Cowin J.,
concurring).
162. Id. at 137.
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Most arguments in favor of the collateral source rule appear to
be based on two general assumptions: that introducing evidence of
third party payments will have a prejudicial effect on the jury, and
that a windfall for one of the parties is unavoidable.163 Those as
sumptions, however, are misguided, especially in the Common
wealth of Massachusetts.164 Moreover, the rule seems to deepen
the problem it purports to cure: instead of avoiding the under-com
pensation of low-income plaintiffs, it can potentially cause the op
posite effect.165
A. Does “Blindfolding”166 the Jury Really Avoid Confusion?
1. The Prejudicial Effect of Insurance
One of the most common justifications for the inadmissibility
of collateral source payments is that such evidence would lead the
jury to reduce or deny adequate compensation.167 Generally, this
seems to be a legitimate concern, especially in times of economic
recession, when juries are possibly becoming more conservative
when assessing damages.168 Since jurors have to award recovery for
“the value of reasonable medical services required to treat the
[plaintiff’s] injury,”169 and the health insurance “write-offs” are not
an adequate measure of such value,170 it is logical to presume that
seeing those bills would confuse the jury.
163.
164.
165.
166.

See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part IV.A-C.
See supra Part IV.A-B.
See EDIE GREENE & BRIAN H. BORNSTEIN, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASSOCIATION, DETERMINING DAMAGES: THE PHYSIOLOGY OF JURY AWARDS, 167
(2002) (describing the “[e]ffects of ‘blindfolding’” jurors, i.e., depriving them from
material information, in order to avoid bias).
167. See Law v. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d 126, 132 (Mass. 2010) (quoting Goldstein v.
Gontarz, 309 N.E.2d 196, 203 (Mass. 1974)). In Goldstein, the court stated that “jurors
might be led by the irrelevancy” of the third party payment and deny recovery for the
plaintiff. Goldstein, 309 N.E.2d at 203; see also Corsetti v. Stone Co., 483 N.E.2d 793,
802 (Mass. 1985).
168. See generally Edie Green, The Art and Science of Litigation Advocacy: Jury
Damage Awards in Times of Recession, THE JURY EXPERT (July 1, 2009), available at
http://www.thejuryexpert.com/2009/07/jury-damage-awards-in-times-of-recession/. (dis
cussing the possible effects of the recession on jury awards, and stating that “jurors who
have recently lost jobs may be especially hard on plaintiffs”).
169. See Rodgers v. Boynton 52 N.E.2d 576, 576 (Mass. 1943).
170. See Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 130 (discussing the standard for recovery of medi
cal expenses in negligence cases); see also id. at133 (stating that at the present time,
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In Massachusetts, however, trying to keep evidence of such
payments away from the jury likely causes more confusion than it
prevents. It is axiomatic that society functions on the presumption
that its members obey the law.171 Since in the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts health insurance is required by statute,172 the jurors
would be justified to suppose that the plaintiff is insured and that
his insurance paid for the better portion of his medical bills.173
Therefore, even if, as proponents of the collateral source rule sug
gest, this information is irrelevant in determining the fair value of
the service,174 now it has become implausible to hide it.
It is a well established rule that the presence of insurance often
has prejudicial effect and is inadmissible,175 since it may cause infla
tion of the award (if the tortfeasor has liability insurance) or defla
tion (if the victim has insurance against the risk in question). In
that sense, however, the juries in Massachusetts already are bi
ased;176 they know it is more likely than not that someone paid for
medical bills admissible under the first sentence of § 79G may bear little relationship to
the “fair and reasonable” value of medical services rendered).
171. The Ancient Roman law presumption of innocence, Ei incumbit probatio qui
dicit, non qui negat (the burden of proof rests on who asserts, not on who denies, i.e. a
person is innocent, until proven guilty) is embedded in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
´
of the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. V-VI; Fran¸cois Quintard-Morenas,
The Presumption of Innocence in the French and Anglo-American Legal Tradition, 58
AM. J. COMP. L. 107, 111 & 111 n.25 (2010).
172. See MASS. GEN. LAWS 111M, § 2(a) (2010) (indicating that, with very narrow
exceptions, all residents of Massachusetts are required to obtain health insurance).
173. The term “better portion of [the] bill[ ]” is used here in the sense of the
major portion of the sum, owed by the patient, which does not necessarily mean the
whole actual bill, since medical providers often accept a fraction of it as payment in full.
174. See, e.g., Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 132; Goldstein v. Gontarz, 309 N.E.2d 196,
203 (Mass. 1974).
175. FED. R. EVID. 411 (stating that evidence that a person charged with negli
gence does or does not have liability insurance is inadmissible). See, e.g., Mangan v.
Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 351 F.2d 24, 25 (7th Cir. 1965) (finding that the defense
counsel’s mentioning of the fact that the plaintiff carried workman’s compensation was
prejudicial). See generally STEIN, supra note 2, § 13:14 (discussing the limited admissi
bility of evidence of collateral sources). Introducing evidence that one of the parties is
insured, however, is not always inadmissible. The courts apply a balancing test to deter
mine admissibility of insurance payments. Compare Wright v. Hiester Const. Co., Inc.,
698 S.E.2d 822, 822-23 (S.C. Ct. App. 2010) (finding that the probative value of liability
insurance outweighed the potential prejudicial effect and the risk of jury confusion),
with Walker v. Big Burger Rests., Inc., No. 09-532, 2010 WL 427736, at *3 (E.D. Pa.
2010) (stating that “any probative value of evidence regarding the assignment of the
lien or workers’ compensation benefits would be outweighed by the prejudicial effect
such evidence could have”).
176. Even in Massachusetts evidence of collateral source payments is admissible
when the jury is misled by the plaintiff. See supra note 43. By the same logic, it should
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the plaintiff’s medical bills, and it is unrealistic to imagine that they
will ignore that fact.
2. Health Insurance “Write-offs” and the “Anchor” Theory
of Damage Determination
At the present time, health insurance write-offs are more of a
rule than an exception, and the uninsured are practically the only
ones who pay full price for medical services.177 Even if the jury
does not know that insurance companies pay discount rates, adopt
ing Griffith’s approach will cure that lack of awareness. The Grif
fith court held that not only may the actual bill be offered into
evidence, but a range of payments accepted by the provider for the
same service may also be offered.178 The very fact that there is a
range is enough to put the jury on notice that some patients are
liable for significantly smaller amounts for the same service than
others. Logically, in cases like Griffith, where that range is particu
larly wide, the jury’s task to determine what is the reasonable value
of the service is exceptionally difficult.
Cognitive psychologists suggest that when quantifying a plain
tiff’s loss, juries rely on “salient numerical reference points,” figura
tively named “anchors.”179 Such “anchors” may be the relief
amount stated by plaintiffs in the ad damnum clause180 of their
complaints, or the cap on damages in the given jurisdiction.181
Studies show that generally “the more you ask for, the more you
get.”182 At the same time, however, the awards may be reduced by
the presence of a “counteranchor”—an amount, proposed by the
defense, especially if that number is offered by an expert.183 In
be admissible if the jury is “misled” by the presumption that everyone in the state is
actually insured.
177. See Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 133; see also HALL & SCHNEIDER, supra note 72,
at 645 (contending that “managed care relegates uninsured patients to a new market
place . . . of uncommon harshness dominated by doctors, hospitals, and insurers” and
explaining that “insurers aggressively negotiate rates for plan members; uninsured pa
tients must ‘bargain’ individually with providers who are determined to recoup what
they bargained away to insurers”).
178. See supra INTRODUCTION.
179. See GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra note 166, at 135.
180. A clause in a complaint, stating the relief sought. BLACK’S LAW DICTION
ARY 43 (9th ed. 2009).
181. See GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra note 166, at 150-59.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 153-55. The expert function is important in Griffith, since the jury
would presumably be presented with information about the range of payments by a
representative of the provider, an expert witness. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 79G
(2010).

642

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:619

sum, often there are two conflicting reference points—one sug
gested by the defendant, and another by the plaintiff—between
which the jury has to choose.
Applying the “anchor” theory to Griffith, however, would
mean that the jury would have to base its determination of the
value of the medical service rendered to the plaintiff not on two,
but on multiple possible reference points, ranging between
$16,387.14 and $112,269.94.184 Despite the purpose for which this
array of numbers would be offered—to aid the jury—they would, in
effect, cancel each other’s “anchoring” function completely. It is
obviously impossible that each number can be an indicator for the
objectively “reasonable” value of the same service.
According to the holistic approach of assessing damages, the
jury will award what intuitively “seems right.”185 Under this ap
proach, without any further guidance, the jury would have no
choice but to make an estimate based on its own preconceived no
tions of appropriateness186 and not on the records presented.187 In
that respect, showing the jury a range of payments accepted for the
same service would be close to meaningless, since none of those
numbers is a solid reference point upon which it could base its
decision.
A Massachusetts jury, however, imagining that the plaintiff is
insured, would be justified to assume that one of those numbers is
in fact “right,” because it reflects the actual payment of the bill. In
that respect, keeping evidence of insurance payments away from
the jurors puts them in an awkward “guessing” position: they know
someone covered the bill, and that the amount paid is likely intro
duced to them as part of the “range” of payments, but they do not
184. See Law v. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d 126, 135 (Mass. 2010) (admitting evidence
for the “range” of payments between the actual payment of the bill and the full amount
of the bill).
185. See GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra note 166 (quoting a study of juries in tort
and contract cases showing that about a third of the jurors pick a number that seems
reasonable, without explicit calculation). The holistic and cognitive approaches are not
mutually exclusive but complement one another. Interestingly, even Griffith’s majority
recognizes the fact that the full bill is not a good indication of reasonableness. See
Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 133 (stating that “American . . . medical care providers have
developed charge structures that may have little or no relationship to the reasonable
value of the medical services at issue”) (emphasis added). Therefore, even the bill is
not a reliable “anchor” for determining the reasonable value of the service.
186. See GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra note 166, at 158-61.
187. See id. at 169 (stating that “in the absence of explicit instructions, juror’s
assessment[s] of damages are likely to be inconsistent, haphazard and, on occasion, con
trary to the . . . law”).
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know which one is the number.188 The collateral source rule, in its
attempt to steer the jury’s attention away from the fact the plaintiff
may be insured (thereby preventing under-compensation), merely
obscures the sum paid. In a state where health insurance is optional
it is probably possible to make the jury “forget” about it. Where
health insurance payment is presumed, however, it is pointless to
try to keep it a secret.
B. Punished Once, Punished Twice: The Collateral Source Rule
and Uninsured Plaintiffs
1. “Compensatory” Damages Are Meant to Compensate
the Victim. Or Are They?
Assessing the “reasonable” value of a medical service is not the
only difficulty confronting a jury in a tort action. The jury also has
to make sure that the victim is placed back in the position he or she
was in before the accident.189 In monetary terms, that means that
the victim should be reimbursed for at least his or her out of pocket
expenses. While in Griffith the plaintiff, whose health insurer nego
tiated exceptionally low payments, will be most likely overcompen
sated,190 under-compensation of other victims in similar
circumstances is just as likely.
188. See Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at139 (Cowin, J., concurring) (maintaining that hid
ing from the jury the fact that the plaintiff may be insured while being expected to be
insured is counterintuitive).
If, in fact, we ever needed to shield jurors from the reality of insurance or
other mechanisms by which another pays a party’s tort damages, we need not
do so now. Jurors know insurance exists; they have it themselves. Yet we
cling to a curious practice whereby we attempt to deny to a juror, who may
himself or herself that day have submitted a claim to a health carrier, the fact
that a party in the case before him also has insurance coverage. The court
today recognizes this reality but coyly deprives that juror of a complete picture
of how that insurance has operated in the case on trial.
Id. (Cowin, J., concurring).
189. See Cortez v. Trans Union, L.L.C., 617 F.3d 688, 693, n.30 (3d Cir. 2010)
(“Unlike punitive damages that are intended to punish and deter, ‘compensatory dam
ages are intended to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered by reason of
the defendant’s wrongful conduct.’”) (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Camp
bell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003)); Westric Battery Co. v. Standard Elec. Co., 482 F.2d 1307,
1318 (10th Cir. 1973) (“Appellant is entitled to be compensated for losses attributable
to the injury inflicted, but it is not entitled to earn a profit.”) (emphasis added); 25 C.J.S.
Damages § 21 (2010) (“Compensatory damages are damages sufficient in amount to
indemnify the injured person for the loss suffered and thereby make him or her whole.
The purpose of awarding compensatory damages is not to enable the injured party to
make a profit on the transaction.”) (emphasis added) (foonote omitted).
190. Ms. Law’s insurance paid a very low amount, compared to the full bill. The
payment by MassHealth was likely on the lower end of the spectrum (since it was signif
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While the 2006 health care reform in Massachusetts decreased
the percent of uninsured residents, a large number of people in the
Commonwealth still do not carry health insurance.191 If any of
those residents becomes injured in a tort and seeks medical atten
tion, he will have to pay full price for the service. For example, let
us imagine that the Griffith plaintiff, Ms. Law, was in fact unin
sured. Then the only way to fully compensate her for her medical
expenses would be to award her the entire amount of her bill. If
Griffith’s rationale applies to the uninsured plaintiffs, the court
would admit no evidence of paid or unpaid amounts. All the jury
would see would be a range of payments between $16,387.14 (or
possibly less, since it is unclear if indeed MassHealth negotiated the
lowest possible rate for that particular service) and $112,269.90.192
While it is impossible to foresee how much the jury would award, it
would likely be a number in between both ends of the spectrum,
and not necessarily the full amount of the bill. In that sense, the
plaintiff would receive less than she owed her medical provider and
would have to pay the difference out-of-pocket.
The Griffith majority, however, explicitly refused to express an
opinion on the question of whether an uninsured patient would be
allowed to admit evidence of his actual payments.193 That approach
unambiguously indicates that the uninsured are regarded as a dif
ferent “class” of tort victims to whom the rule may or may not ap
ply. Trying to treat the uninsured differently than the insured raises
an equal protection issue, which is beyond the scope of this Note.
In reality, whether such evidence is admitted or not, the uninsured
plaintiff remains in a precarious position.
If evidence of actual payment by the victim is not admitted and
all the jury sees is the bill and a range of payments accepted for the
service, the plaintiff will most likely be under-compensated. The
only way for the jury to fully compensate the victim will be to
award nothing short of the full bill. In order to do that, the jury will
have to assume that the victim has no insurance, and no “write
icantly lower than the bill submitted) and therefore Ms. Law can only be over and not
under-compensated. In fact, she already was awarded more than what MassHealth paid
for her treatment. See supra note 61.
191. The most recent national data shows that in 2008 there were 264,000 unin
sured Massachusetts residents. See A Preliminary Evaluation of Health Insurance Cov
erage in the 2008 American Community Survey, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, (Sept. 22, 2009),
available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthins/data/acs/2008/2008ACS_healthins.
pdf.
192. See Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 135.
193. See id. at 136 n.16.
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offs” are in place. Presuming that, however, would be counterintui
tive for a Massachusetts jury, since health insurance is mandatory in
the Commonwealth.194 Therefore, it is more likely than not that
the jury, unaware of how much was actually paid for the service and
assuming the victim is insured, would award an amount smaller
than the entire bill,195 thereby under-compensating the plaintiff for
her injury.
If evidence of actual payment by the victim were admitted, it
would solve the problem of under-compensation. However, it is
quite unrealistic that the uninsured plaintiff will have paid her med
ical bills in full in advance of her personal injury trial.196 Even
though there are probably some exceptions, it is hard to imagine
that a person who cannot afford health insurance197 could come up
with a large sum out-of-pocket, pay his own bills, and then try to
recoup the payment in court. Absent evidence of actual payment,
the plaintiff cannot show that he is responsible for the entire bill,
because he is not allowed to state that he has no insurance (and the
jury will most likely presume he is insured). Therefore, whether
evidence of actual payments is admitted or not, the uninsured vic
tim would be “punished”: either for being uninsured or for not pay
ing his bill, because in each of these scenarios the plaintiff will not
be able to present evidence of his actual payment.198
194. This hypothetical is applicable only in cases where the injured party is in fact
a Massachusetts resident and the jury is aware of that fact or where the plaintiff is
resident of a different state, but the jury is unaware of it, and assumes the plaintiff
resides in the Commonwealth. Because this Note is intended to discuss the effect of the
collateral source rule on Massachusetts residents only, the rule’s implication on out-of
state plaintiffs is outside the scope of this work.
195. See, e.g., GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra note 166, at 168-69 (discussing the
effects of hiding information from the jury regarding the economic consequences of
their awards and stating that “a blindfold may permit (rather than prevent) juries to
reach verdicts based on misinformation”). The authors give an example of a situation
where jurors presume that the defendant has insurance, covering the total loss and ex
plain that in such circumstances the jury may “inflate [plaintiff’s] award,” resulting in
the defendant, with no insurance, having to pay an artificially inflated award. Id.
196. Evidence of the unpaid bill would not help the plaintiff unless it is made
explicit that he has no insurance that would pay for it.
197. Even though insufficient financial means is not the only reason for being
uninsured, statistics suggest it is the leading reason. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra
note 191 (pointing out that the uninsured are generally lower income residents).
198. Perhaps an exception of the collateral source rule that would make it inap
plicable in cases where the plaintiff is uninsured would solve the issue of possible
under-compensation. Such an exception, however, seems against public policy, because
it would benefit plaintiffs, who have violated the law by not obtaining obligatory health
insurance, while law-abiding victims whose insurance has unfavorable terms (such as
high deductibles and insignificant write-offs) would still be disadvantaged.
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2. The Uninsured in Massachusetts Are Already a
Marginalized Class
One of the arguments in favor of the collateral source rule,
articulated by the Griffith majority, is that admitting evidence of
insurance payments would create a perception of the public health
benefit recipients as being a “lower” class of people, whose insur
ance pays less than full price for their treatment.199 The effect of
that social stratification of plaintiffs would arguably result in a low
ering of the awards for economically disadvantaged victims. The
majority’s argument did not rise to a constitutional concern but was
framed in terms of social policy. If, however, the court is worried
about disadvantaging low income individuals (which undisputedly
MassHealth recipients are),200 it should be just as concerned about
plaintiffs who do not qualify for MassHealth and still cannot afford
insurance.
An uninsured plaintiff is not necessarily a sympathetic one, be
cause in addition to violating a state law, he or she is hindering the
goals of the Massachusetts Health Care Reform Act and, presuma
bly, is burdening society at large.201 Considering the fact that being
uninsured is a violation punishable by law,202 however, it becomes
important to determine the probable reasons why certain Massa
chusetts residents violate it. When residents are actually paying for
199. Law v. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d 126, 134 n.11 (Mass. 2010); see also Brief for
Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys as Amicus Curiae, Law v. Griffith, 930
N.E.2d 126 (Mass. 2010), 2008 WL 7182151, at *13 (arguing that allowing evidence for
actual payments leads to “discriminatory legal treatment of the under privileged”).
200. In order to qualify for MassHealth a resident needs to meet the income re
quirement of having income less than 100% to 150% poverty level, except in special
circumstances. See What Are the Income Limits?, MASS RESOURCES.ORG, http://www.
massresources.org/pages.cfm?contentID=35&pageID=13&subpages=yes&SecondLevel
dynamicID=565&DynamicID=559#income (last visited May 24, 2012).
201. The idea of mandatory coverage is that it will bring the cost of health insur
ance down by providing a large pool of people contributing smaller payments and by
reducing emergency room losses. By virtue of the 1986 Emergency Medical Treatment
and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), an emergency room (ER) cannot deny treatment to
an uninsured patient. That is why, allegedly, many uninsured patients use the ER as
their only health care option and then do not pay their bills, causing losses, which are
subsequently passed on to the other patients by inflating the price of the ER services.
Presumably, if everyone has insurance, residents will more often seek preventive care,
which is cheaper than emergency care, and will have their bills paid by their insurance,
avoiding losses to the provider and therefore avoiding price inflation. In this respect,
being uninsured theoretically contributes to high costs of medical services to everyone.
See generally Craig Richardson, Mandatory Health Insurance: Lessons from Massachu
setts, 29 CATO J. 335 (2009), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj29n2/cj29
n2-7.pdf.
202. See supra Part IV.C.
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being uninsured, neglect and lack of foresight are hardly the default
reasons anymore. While there are many possible reasons why a
person would choose not to purchase health insurance, pricing ap
pears to be one of the major reasons.
According to a study conducted by The State Health Access
Data Assistance Center the bulk of the uninsured in Massachusetts
are lower income individuals.203 The survey points out that the un
insured in Massachusetts are primarily single young males, mem
bers of racial or ethnic minorities, non-citizens, or people who are
not proficient in the English language.204 Other than the “single
young male” category, the rest are economically disadvantaged and
already marginalized. Therefore, if the Massachusetts Supreme Ju
dicial Court is concerned with protecting the poor, it has a good
reason to worry not only about the poor insured victims (who, as
Griffith shows, have a legitimate chance of getting a windfall)205 but
also the uninsured poor as well (who likely will be undercompensated).
In addition to being economically disadvantaged, the unin
sured in Massachusetts are already penalized for their non-compli
ance with the law by having their tax return reduced.206 Of course,
the fines they have to pay for being uninsured do not confer any
health care benefits and they would still have to pay out-of-pocket
for any expenses incurred, presumably at full price, even when they
are injured by someone else.
The public and individual benefits of mandatory health insur
ance are not disputed in this Note.207 In this respect, the penalties
203. See Sharon K. Long, Lokendra Phadera & Victoria Lynch, Massachusetts
Health Reform in 2008: Who Are the Remaining Uninsured Adults?, SHADAC.ORG 2
(Aug. 2010), http://www.shadac.org/files/shadac/publications/MassReform2008Unin
suredBrief.pdf.
204. Id. at 3.
205. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 132.
206. See Special Topics of Interest to Massachusetts Residents, MASS
RESOURCES.ORG, available at http://www.massresources.org/infopages.cfm?ABPageID=
93&MainParentID=93#howmuchpenalty (last visited May 24, 2012) (providing penalty
rates for the uninsured). While those penalties do not affect persons whose income is
too low to require filing a tax return, it certainly has an effect on people whose income,
albeit being above the Federal Poverty Guidelines, is still far from being high. In practi
cal terms, if, for example, in 2010, a married Massachusetts couple earning between
$29,148.00 and $36,432.00 (200%-250% of the Federal Poverty Guidelines) did not
carry adequate health insurance, the couple will have to pay $912.00 ($456.00 each)
penalty out of their 2010 tax return. See id. If that couple has gross income of
$43,716.00 in 2010 and both partners are older than 27, they will have to pay $ 2,232.00
($1,116.00) per person. See id.
207. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
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for violation of the requirement are not challenged. It is the con
tention of this Note, however, that those Massachusetts residents
who are uninsured or inadequately insured already pay the price for
their violations and there is no justification for further penalizing
them. Since applying the collateral source rule to plaintiff’s medical
expenses may lead to under-compensation of uninsured victims, it
amounts to duplicate punishment. Certainly, uninsured individuals
made the choice to break the law and bear the risk of injury on
their own. However, if their injuries are caused by the negligent
conduct of another, the risk of loss should be shifted to the wrong
doer and not remain with the victim.
C. Overcompensation and Deterrence: Is a Windfall Really
Inevitable?
1. Defendants Do Not Directly Profit from Plaintiff’s
Insurance “Write-Offs”
The collateral source rule is based on the presumption that a
windfall for one of the parties is practically inevitable: either the
victim will get more than enough to make him “whole” or the
tortfeasor will benefit from the victim’s contract with his insurer.208
Therefore, since the defendant is the person whose behavior society
is trying to correct, it is considered fair that she pay the full value of
her wrong, even if that amounts to overcompensating the
plaintiff.209
208. See supra Part I.A.1.
209. The Griffith majority implicitly agrees with the proposition that one of the
parties to the dispute will inevitably get a windfall: either the plaintiff will receive more
that his insurance paid for his service, or the defendant will pay less than the full
amount the medical provider charged. The latter effect will occur if the defendant only
pays the reduced price of the service. However, this reduction is a result of the plain
tiff’s insurance company negotiating lower rates with the provider and it will arguably
be unfair to allow the defendant, the adverse party, to benefit from it. Therefore, Grif
fith suggests, it will be more just for the plaintiff, the intended beneficiary of the health
insurance, to receive the windfall, and not the defendant. See Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at
132.
[R]educing recovery by the amount of the benefits received by the plaintiff
would grant a windfall to the defendant by allowing a credit for the reasonable
value of those benefits. Such credit would result in the benefits being effec
tively directed to the tortfeasor and from the intended party-the injured plain
tiff. If there is a windfall, it is considered more just that the injured person
profit rather than grant the wrongdoer relief from full responsibility for the
wrongdoing.
Id.
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This line of reasoning, however, is somewhat misguided, since
in most cases the defendant receives no direct “benefit” from the
presumably lower amount of compensation paid for the plaintiff’s
medical expenses. As much as the proponents of the collateral
source rule want to shy away from that fact, in reality, in personal
injury cases the defendant’s liability insurance210 is the one paying
for the plaintiff’s injuries. If, for example, Mr. Griffith had no lia
bility insurance,211 he would have had to pay Ms. Law’s health care
expenses out of pocket. Only in those circumstances would it be
fair to say that Mr. Griffith would personally get a windfall if he
only had to pay the amount negotiated by the plaintiff’s health in
surance (assuming the negotiated rate was not the “fair and reason
able” value of the service). If, however, what the plaintiff’s health
insurance paid was in fact the fair value of the service, or if Mr.
Griffith was insured, the “inevitable windfall” theory falls apart.
If Mr. Griffith had liability insurance (which is the more plausi
ble scenario, since he was required to have it by law)212 and the
insurance, rather than Mr. Griffith personally, paid for Ms. Law’s
medical expenses, it would make no immediate difference to Mr.
Griffith whether the insurance company paid $16,000.00 or
$120,000.00. While his insurance premiums would presumably go
up, that increase would hardly be influenced by the amount
awarded to the plaintiff, because he would be penalized with the
same amount of surcharge points.213 In effect, the defendant’s in
210. Liability insurance is required for a motor vehicle registration. See Applying
for a Registration, MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, REGISTRY OF
MOTOR VEHICLES, available at http://www.mass.gov/rmv/regs/index.htm (last visited
May 24, 2012).
211. It is not clear from the case, whether he had insurance or not. In fact, dis
cussing the defendant’s insurance status would have been considered prejudicial in and
of itself. See FED. R. EVID. 411; Mangan v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 351 F.2d 24
(7th Cir. 1965) (finding that defense counsel’s mentioning of the fact that the plaintiff
carried workman’s compensation was prejudicial). See generally STEIN supra note 2,
§ 13:14 (discussing the limited admissibility of evidence of collateral sources).
212. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 1A (2008); see also RAYMOND J. KENNEY,
´
J. FARRIS, 12 MASS. PRACTICE, MOTOR VEHICLE LAW & PRACTICE
JR. & TERESA
§ 25:26 (4th ed. 2008) (stating that ”[s]ince the 1920’s it has been mandatory that all
operators traveling on public ways and roads within the Commonwealth and all vehicles
registered in Massachusetts, be covered by a compulsory motor vehicle insurance
policy”).
213. See Merit Rating Board, MASS. DEP’T OF TRANSP., http://www.massdot.state.
ma.us/rmv/MeritRatingBoard.aspx (last visited May 24, 2012). According to the point
surcharge system, Mr. Griffith would have received four surcharge points (since the
claim against him is for over $2000) whether he paid MassHealth’s write-off price or the
full amount of the bill. Points are counted and not weighed, i.e. the surcharge is based
on the number of points and not directly on the severity of the damage caused. Id.
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surance premiums would increase at the same rate, regardless of
whether his liability insurer paid the full medical bill or the dis
counted amount; therefore, the defendant would get no
“windfall.”214
In addition to avoiding a “windfall” to the defendant, the idea
behind requiring him to pay an amount, likely higher than the ac
tual sum paid, is that this is the only way to effectively deter the
defendant from wrongdoing.215 This “you break it, you buy it” phi
losophy, however, does not always serve its intended purpose when
the tortfeasor is insured.216 If the amount paid does not directly
affect the insurance premiums of the tortfeasor, inflating the com
pensatory payment to the plaintiff beyond the limits of actual com
pensation would hardly deter the defendant more effectively.217
2. Fair Compensation Does Not Require a “Windfall” to
the Victim218
The problems of overcompensating tort victims and juries that
are overly sympathetic towards the victim have been widely dis
cussed.219 This Note, however, is not concerned per se with the is
214. Indeed, the only party that could possibly get a “windfall” in this situation is
the insurance company, which would have to pay less if the plaintiff’s health insurer had
negotiated lower prices for the health care provider’s services. Therefore the defen
dant’s auto insurer would, in fact, benefit from the plaintiff’s contract with the plaintiff’s
health insurer. This Note is not intended to decide whether or not this is justified.
Rather, its focus is on the defendant, since the collateral source rule is intended to help
deter him from risk-taking. And the insurer getting a windfall has no bearing on the
defendant’s behavior, or his pocket, because he will be surcharged by the same amount
regardless. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
215. See 2 DOBBS, supra note 18, at 19 (stating that tort law “deter[s] certain
kinds of conduct by imposing liability when that conduct causes harm”); see also supra
note 16.
216. 2 DOBBS, supra note 18, at 44-45 (discussing the possible effects of liability
insurance and stating that “anyone can justifiably entertain the suspicion that the more
insurance serves the compensation goal, the less it will serve the deterrence goal”).
217. The whole deterrence idea rests on the presumption that a person will not
engage in risk-taking if she is required to pay “full price” for her wrongdoing. If how
ever, the wrongdoer has to pay the same surcharge, whether her liability insurance paid
the “full” or “discounted” price, paying a bigger award will not deter the tortfeasor any
more effectively than a smaller one.
218. See generally STEIN, supra note 2, § 13.3 (arguing that since the insured
plaintiff did not have to pay for his own medical treatment, the compensatory goal of
the tort system does not require the defendant to pay for it). This Note does not
completely embrace that approach. Rather than maintaining that the damage award
should be offset by the collateral payment, this Note advocates that the payment should
be introduced into evidence.
219. See generally Nancy S. Marder, The Medical Malpractice Debate: The Jury as
Scapegoat, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (2005) (arguing that the notion that the
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sue of the plaintiff getting a “windfall,” but with the shortcomings
of the collateral source rule, leading to overcompensation of some
victims, while depriving others of adequate compensation.220 It is
the assertion of this Note that the whole notion of “inevitable wind
fall” is misplaced, because the “reasonable value” of a medical ser
vice is not a magical number dreamed up in a vacuum; rather, it is a
function of the totality of circumstances and, as such, may vary. It
is possible that a relatively modest award, influenced by evidence of
low actual payments, is nevertheless still reasonable. Therefore, it
is possible for the tortfeasor to pay the fair and reasonable value of
the injury she caused, without overcompensating the victim.
In short, a subjective, fact-based approach should be taken in
order to determine the reasonable value of a service. Indeed, such
an approach may render different results for different victims, de
pending on the terms of their health insurance. This brings the fo
cus back to the problem that the defendant should not benefit from
the victim’s contract with a third party insurer.221 The suggestion of
this Note, however, is not that the collateral source payments
should be subtracted from the award,222 nor that the award should
be limited to the actual payments,223 but simply that the jury should
be allowed to consider those payments when assessing the appro
priate damages. To that effect, the defendant will not directly reap
civil juries tend to award excessive compensation and thereby exacerbate the medical
malpractice “‘crisis’” is misguided); Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American
Civil Jury: An Empirical Perspective, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 849, 849 (1998) (contending that
juries are “excessively generous in awarding compensatory damages, and out of control
when awarding punitive damages”); JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA AND THE
CIVIL JUROR 175-96 (The Roscoe Pound Foundation 1988) (discussing the phenomenon
of “ordinary people” awarding “mega-verdicts”).
220. See supra Part V.B.
221. See The Propeller Monticello v. Mollision, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 152, 155
(1854); Helfend v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 465 P.2d 61, 66-67 (Cal. 1970); Law v.
Griffith, 930 N.E.2d 126, 132 (Mass. 2010); Shea v. Rettie, 192 N.E. 44, 45 (Mass. 1934).
The notion of incidental benefit from a third party contract is articulated in Implement
Serv., Inc. v. Tecumseh Prods. Co., 726 F. Supp. 1171, 1182 n.9 (S.D. Ind., 1989) (stating
that an “incidental beneficiary” is “one who benefits from the contracts of another, but
whose benefit was not the intent of the contracting parties”).
222. This approach was taken in the medical malpractice area. See MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 231, § 60G (2010) (abrogating the collateral source rule in medical malprac
tice and providing that the award should be offset by any collateral payments minus the
premiums paid by the insured to secure those benefits).
223. Such is the approach towards collateral source payments paid by Medi-Cal—
California’s equivalent of MassHealth. See Hanif v. Hous. Auth. of Yolo Cnty., 246 Cal.
Rptr. 192, 194-95, (Ct. App. 1988) (ruling that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover an
amount larger than the actual payment for his medical service, so long as that amount is
reasonable).
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any “benefit” from the plaintiff’s contract. At best, the tortfeasor
may be indirectly advantaged, which is too speculative and tangen
tial to be considered.224
A possible critique of this subjective approach is the risk of
implicit discrimination against recipients of government sponsored
health insurance.225 While there is some merit to this concern, the
same argument may be used in favor of the uninsured indigent pa
tients, who would be disadvantaged by the exclusion of evidence of
actual payments.226 In reality those two “classes” of patients (the
MassHealth recipients and the uninsured poor) seem to bear mir
roring risks. If the collateral source rule is abolished, a MassHealth
patient may indeed be viewed as a member of a marginal “class”
but will not bear the risk of being under-compensated. If the collat
eral source rule stands, an uninsured indigent victim will not neces
sarily be viewed by the jury as “poor” (because it will not know the
victim could not afford insurance), but will most likely be undercompensated, because the jury will assume he is insured. Since the
tort system is concerned more with compensating the victim227 and
less with his economic appearance to the jury, it is fair to expect it
to be more disturbed by potential under-compensation of the plain
tiff than by the jury perceiving him as “poor.” It is arguably correct
that the “reasonable” value of a service is an indicator of the gravity
of the plaintiff’s injury and therefore it affects the entire compensa
tion of the victim.228 The jury, however, would hardly need to use
this circumstantial evidence in order to determine the extent of the
injury, since direct evidence and expert testimony as to the nature
and severity of the injury are clearly admissible.229
224. Speculative, because it is not clear whether a smaller award will prevent the
defendant’s insurance from going up; tangential, because it concerns not only the con
tract between the plaintiff and his health insurance, but also the contract between the
defendant and her liability insurance.
225. See Brief for the Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellant, supra note 199, at *13. (arguing that allowing evidence for actual
payments leads to “discriminatory legal treatment of the under privileged”).
226. See supra Part V.A.
227. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 cmt. a (1979) (stating “the law of
torts attempts primarily to put an injured person in a position as nearly as possible
equivalent to his position prior to the tort”).
228. See Brief for The Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys as Amici Cu
riae Supporting Appellant, supra note 199, at *18 (“[A]pplying a significantly lower
price . . . gives the whole claim, including the pain and suffering aspect, an overall
cheaper feel.”).
229. See 31A AM. JUR. 2D Expert and Opinion Evidence § 244 (2002) “Medical
experts may permissibly testify as to the duration and permanency of injuries, including
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Another justification of the “windfall” for the plaintiff is the
belief that the extra money would be used to offset other costs, in
cluding attorney fees and future medical expenses.230 This asser
tion, however, is also highly speculative and premised on the
assumption that the jury will not adjust its award to allow for such
costs and will necessarily under-compensate the victim. In fact,
eighty percent of the mock jurors in a study indicated that they dis
cussed and factored the attorney fees the plaintiff would have had
to pay in their damage assessment, even when they were not in
structed to do so.231 Accordingly, the notion that it is permissible to
offset those costs is misguided.
D. Redressing Punitive Damages as Compensatory
In addition to assessing the adequate compensation for the
plaintiff, the common law rule permits the jury to award punitive
damages.232 The jury, however, is not required to award such dam
ages.233 One of the likely effects of the collateral source rule is to
defeat the jury’s discretion and make it award punitive damages
without realizing it. The Griffith court, for example, justified giving
a windfall to the plaintiff by suggesting that the deterrent purpose
of tort damages requires paying the “fair” (not discounted) value of
the wrong that the defendant committed.234 The compensatory
function of damage awards in Griffith would have been satisfied
even if the defendant had had to pay only the sum of $16,387.00
MassHealth paid. Instead, the plaintiff sought to introduce the bills
totaling $112,269.00 into evidence, and was allowed to do so.235 It is
unclear how much the jury would have been likely to award on re
mand, but, technically, the purpose of any amount over the actual
sum paid is to deter and not to compensate. As such, the extra
amount fits within the definition of “punitive damages.”236
such things as the effect of an injury on a person’s ability to work.” Id. (footnotes
omitted).
230. See supra note 56.
231. See GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra note 166, at 169.
232. 1 DOBBS, supra note 18, at 1062.
233. Id.
234. See Law v. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d 126, 132 (Mass. 2010) (“The purpose of the
collateral source rule is tort deterrence. The tortfeasor is required to compensate the
injured party for the fair value of the harm caused, and is not to benefit from [the
victim’s] contractual arrangements.”).
235. Id. at 129.
236. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1354 (9th ed. 2009) (defining punitive dam
ages as damages “assessed by way of penalizing the wrongdoer or making an example
to others”); see also Lopez v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 129 P.3d 487, 491 (Ariz. Ct. App.
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This approach is questionable for two reasons. First, it would
duplicate the punitive damages that the defendant would have to
pay or would substitute them (if the jury chooses not to award puni
tive damages).237 Second, it ignores the fact that the defendant’s
liability insurance might ultimately pay the bill and that, as a result,
the economic effect on the defendant would be, at best, indirect.238
Generally, punitive damages are not covered by liability insur
ance.239 When the damages are labeled “compensatory,” however,
they would be paid by the insurer, leading to overcompensating the
victim without effectively deterring the wrongdoer, and simultane
ously contributing to higher liability insurance premiums.
It appears that the collateral source rule, applied in the context
of Massachusetts personal injury cases, can confuse the jury in
many aspects. The rule does not allow the jury to know if the plain
tiff had health insurance, and it fosters a reasonable presumption
that he was insured. It disallows evidence of actual payments and
thereby makes it highly likely that the jury will either under-com
pensate the plaintiff or grant him a windfall. Often the rule may
lead the jury to believe it is compensating the plaintiff, while it is, in
fact, punishing the tortfeasor. In the meantime, the rule provides
no real benefit to any party, other than to a plaintiff whose insur
ance negotiated exceptionally low rates with the health care pro
vider. This was the case in Law v. Griffith, and as a result, the
plaintiff could have ultimately walked out of the courtroom with
$95,882.76—the difference between what her insurer paid for her
treatment and what her medical provider billed the insurer.
CONCLUSION
The collateral source rule should be repealed in Massachusetts,
because in a state where both health insurance and liability insur
ance are mandatory, the traditional rationales for the rule are irre
2006) (stating that “[i]n many respects, the [collateral source] rule is punitive”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
237. Awarding punitive damages generally requires that the defendant act with
“recklessness, malice, or deceit.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1354 (9th ed. 2009). From
the facts in Griffith, it does not seem that the defendant’s conduct rose to that level.
238. See discussion supra Part C.1.
239. See, e.g., Santos v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 556 N.E.2d 983 (Mass. 1990)
(ruling that punitive damages are not recoverable under either of both defendants’ in
surance policies”); see also Insurability of Punitive Damages, MCCULLOUGH, CAMP
BELL & LANE LLP (2004) http://www.mcandl.com/puni_frame.html (stating that
“[t]ypically, courts that have concluded that punitive damages ought not to be
insurable”).
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versibly antiquated. The rule does not effectively serve to deter the
wrongdoer, because her liability insurance pays for the damage. It
does not guarantee adequate compensation of the victim, as it cre
ates the risk of under-compensating some plaintiffs, while overcom
pensating others. Since the rule is counterintuitive when insurance
is presumed, it does not prevent jury confusion but instead exacer
bates it.
Overall, the shortcomings of the collateral source rule in Mas
sachusetts significantly outweigh its benefits. Moreover, concerns,
such as the risk that a jury would under-evaluate an insured plain
tiff’s injury, are more appropriately addressed with jury instruc
tions,240 rather than by “blindfolding” the jury. For all these
reasons, the rule should be abrogated and the jury should be al
lowed to factor the actual payments of medical expenses into its
compensatory damages award.
While mystifying the behavior of a character like Oscar Wilde’s
Lady Alroy adds dramatism and suspense to a literary piece, ob
scuring a plaintiff’s insurance in Massachusetts has no such creative
value. Made obsolete by our contemporary reality, the collateral
source rule serves no meaningful purpose; it simply perpetuates the
“mystery” of a Sphinx without a secret.
Tsvetelina Gerova-Wilson*

240. See LAURENCE H. GELLER & PETER HEMENWAY, THE JUROR’S LONELY
QUEST: LAST CHANCE FOR JUSTICE 289 (NCDS Press 1977) (stating that “jury instruc
tions, properly and promptly given, can make the law understandable and have tremen
dous potential for empowering jurors and for streamlining our current system”).
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